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1. INTRODUCTION
On May 19, 2004, the United States introduced a Resolution to the United
Nations Security Council for a third year in a row, requesting it to exempt from
the International Criminal Court (ICC) all current and former troops and
personnel from non-International Criminal Court member states, like the United
States, who serve on United Nations' missions.' If approved this year, the
Resolution would have renewed Resolution 1487, which was adopted by the
Security Council on June 12, 2003 and which was itself a renewal of Resolution
1422, adopted by the Security Council on July 12, 2002.2 The vote for the
Resolution was scheduled for May 21 st, but was later postponed indefinitely
when the Security Council realized that the United States might not receive
enough support to secure the passage of the Resolution, given the recent
revelations of prisoner abuse at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.3 In order for the
Resolution to pass, nine out of the fifteen members of the Security Council had
* J.D. candidate 2006, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University; Graduated
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1. US. Renews Demand for ICC Exemption for UN Peacekeepers, CITIZENS FOR GLOBAL
SOLUTIONS, June 22, 2004, at http://globalsolutions.org/programs/lawjustice/news/unscrenewal.html.
2. CITIZENS FOR GLOBAL SOLUTIONS, U.S. POLICY ON THE ICC (June 30, 2004), at
http://globalsolutions.org/programs/lawjustice/icc/resources/uspolicy.html.
3. U.S. Renews Demand for ICC Exemption for UN Peacekeepers, supra note 1.
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to vote in favor of it.4 However, seven member countries including Spain,
Brazil, France, Germany, Benin, Chile and China, had already made clear their
intentions to abstain during this round of votes, thus making it impossible for
the Resolution to attain the required votes. '
In light of the ubiquitous reports published around the world, revealing
United States soldiers torturing Iraqi prisoners, and given the Security Council
members refusal to immunize from the International Criminal Court's
jurisdiction United States troops and personnel, especially those responsible for
the prisoner abuses, the United States decided not to pursue the renewal of
Resolution 1487 any further.6 Finally on June 23rd, the United States withdrew
its request from the Security Council to renew Resolution 1487. 7 The decision
not to seek a renewal of Resolution 1487, which expired on June 30, 2004, did
not change, however, the position of the United States regarding the exemption
of United States troops from the International Criminal Court's jurisdiction.8
In fact, during a State Department's Press Briefing carried out on the same day
the United States announced its decision to withdraw the Resolution, the United
States spokesman, Richard Boucher, expressed the following:
[W]e believe that the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court
... can't be established over nationals of states that are not party to
the Rome [S]tatue and that, therefore, that Americans and others who
are not members of the Rome [S]tatute, who participate in United
Nations peacekeeping, need to be protected from some kind of
misguided prosecution because of actions they might undertake while
participating in those operations. 9
The question that arises then, is whether despite withdrawing the
Resolution, the United States was justified this year in seeking an exemption for
its troops and personnel from the International Criminal Court's jurisdiction, in
light of the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal?
This issue deserves some attention for various important reasons. Since the
International Criminal Court, which prosecutes criminals that have committed
war crimes, crimes of genocide, and crimes against humanity, 0 came into being
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See U.S. Withdraws Its Demands for Peacekeeping Exemption Renewal, CITIZENS FOR GLOBAL
SOLUTIONS, June 23, 2004, at http://globalsolutions.org/programs/lawjustice/news/nounscrenewal.html.
7. Id.
8. See Richard Boucher, U.S. Department of State Spokesman, Press Briefing (June 23, 2004),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2004/33845.htm.
9. Id.
10. Makau Mutua, America and the International Criminal Court, NATION (Nairobi), Jan. 11, 2004,
http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/icc/2004/011 Iamerica.htm.
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on July 1, 2002, the United States has consistently opposed it and has expressed
its opposition by seeking exemptions for its troops from prosecution by the
International Criminal Court." The exemption the United States sought this
year was the third consecutive one. 2 The reason this exemption deserves atten-
tion, is that it was sought at a time when the United States was being criticized
for committing the same type of crimes it went to war with Iraq to prevent. 13
This issue deserves additional attention because although American troops
tortured the Abu Ghraib prisoners, they will not, however, be prosecuted for
these crimes by the International Criminal Court, given that the International
Criminal Court currently has no jurisdiction over the action of United States
soldiers in Iraq."4 This means that current United States war crimes committed
in Iraq will go unpunished by the International Criminal Court '" There is a
possibility in the future, however, that United States troops accused of engaging
in massive human rights violations in International Criminal Court member
states could be subject to prosecution by the International Criminal Court. 6 In
such cases, if the Security Council had granted the United States an exemption
for its troops from prosecution by the International Criminal Court, then it
would have placed the United States above international law and these crimes
would have once again gone unpunished by the International Criminal Court. 7
In light of the aforementioned facts, this article aims to establish that the
United States was not justified in seeking an exemption of its troops from
prosecution by the International Criminal Court, in light of the prisoner abuse
scandal. The first section of the article will provide the background history of
the International Criminal Court and the detailed reasons why the United States
has opposed the International Criminal Court in the past and continues to do so
today. The second section of the article will illustrate the past and current
efforts made by the United States to exempt its troops from the International
Criminal Court's jurisdiction. Lastly, this paper will analyze why the United
States was not justified in seeking the exemption for its troops from the
International Criminal Court this year.
11. See also U.S. Renews Demand for ICC Exemption for UN Peacekeepers, supra, note 1.
12. Id.
13. See Matua, supra note 10.
14. See Associated Press, U.S. Drops U.N. Bid for War Crime Shield, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2004
(explaining that American troops in Iraq are currently not open to prosecution by the ICC, given that neither
Iraq nor the US are member states of the ICC).
15. See id.
16. See Colum Lynch, U.S. Alters Its Plan for Exemption at Court, WASH. POST, June 23, 2004, at
A13, (explaining that US troops that have committed human rights violations could be subject to prosecution
by the ICC if US courts refuse to try them).
17. See id.
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II. HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE UNITED
STATES OPPOSITION
Attempts by the international community to create a permanent inter-
national war tribunal have is not a recent trend. The international community
had attempted numerous times in the past to establish an international tribunal
responsible for prosecuting egregious crimes against humanity. For example,
after the failed attempts to establish an International Tribunal after World War
I, the international community successfully established the Tribunals of
Nuremberg and Tokyo, and in so doing, laid the foundation for international
criminal justice. 8 A few decades later international justice was further pursued
when the ad hoc Tribunals of Rwanda and former Yugoslavia were also
established, and which have now been operating for nearly ten years. 9 Most
recently, in 1995, negotiations on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court began at the United Nations, based on a draft statute prepared and then
adopted by the International Law Commission in July 1994."° If ratified by
sixty states, the Rome Statute, which details the Courts jurisdiction, structure,
and function, would enter into force, thereby establishing the world's first
independent and permanent International Criminal Court.2
Finally, on July 7, 1998, the Rome Statute establishing the International
Criminal Court was adopted at an international conference in Rome by 120
states.22 Four years later, on July 1, 2002, after the sixtieth instrument of ratifi-
cation was delivered to the Secretary General, the Statute entered into force,
making the International Criminal Court the first permanent international
tribunal.23 As of May 2004, with the ratification of Congo, the International
Criminal Court currently has ninety-four state parties, those states that have
ratified the Rome Statute, and 137 signatories.24
Although the United States supported the creation of the International Cri-
minal Court back in 1994, it nevertheless, remained highly critical of the Court.25
18. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, CHRONOLOGY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,
at http://www.icc-cpi.int/ataglance/whatistheicc/chronology.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2004).
19. See id.
20. Id.
21. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION, at www.icc-
cpi.int/ataglance/whatistheicc/history.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2004).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. CITIZENS FOR GLOBAL SOLUTIONS, STATUS OF THE ICC AND U.S. POLICY, JANUARY-MAY 2004
(June 9, 2004), at http://www.globalsolutions.org/programs/lawjustice/faqs/spring2004.html.
25. Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1994 and 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-236, §517(a) - (b), 108
Stat. 382 (1994). The United States Senate expressed its full support for the establishment of the ICC in the
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995. Id. In Section 517 titled Sense of the Senate
on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, the Senate expressed the following:
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In 2000 when President Clinton signed the Rome Statute,26 he brought to light
the concerns he had over the scope of the International Criminal Court's
expansive jurisdiction.27 In a statement made by President Clinton the same day
he signed the Rome Statute, he expressed that although he had signed the
statute, he did not support its ratification since significant flaws still remained
in the statute.28  His main concern was that when the Court would start
functioning, it would not only exercise jurisdiction over troops and personnel
of states that had ratified the Rome Statute, but would also claim jurisdiction
over troops and personnel of states that had not ratified the Statute. 29 Despite
his dissatisfaction with the scope of the International Criminal Court's
jurisdiction, President Clinton acknowledged that he had approved the signing
of the Statute to "reaffirm the United States strong support for international
accountability." 30
The concerns articulated by President Clinton in 2000, were similar to
those shared by President Bush in 2002, when he decided to nullify the United
States signature of the Rome Statute.3' President Bush was concerned that aside
from having jurisdiction to prosecute war crimes, crimes of genocide and
aggression, and crimes against humanity, 32 the International Criminal Court
would have jurisdiction not only over crimes committed by officials and
personnel from states that are a party to it, but also over crimes committed on
The freedom and security of the international community rests on the sanctity of the
rule of law. The international community is increasingly threatened by unlawful acts
such as war crimes, genocide, aggression, crimes against humanity.. It is the sense of
the Senate that (1) the establishment of an international criminal court with jurisdiction
over crimes of an international character would greatly strengthen the international rule
of law; (2) such court would thereby serve the interests of the United States and the
world community; and (3) the United States delegation should make every effort to
advance this proposal at the United Nations.
Id.
26. US. Signs Rome Treaty Establishing ICC, UNITED NATIONS ASS'N OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, Jan. 3, 2001, at http://www.unausa.org/newindex.asp?place=http://www.unausa.org/policy/News
ActionAlerts/info/dcOl0301 .asp (explaining that on December 31, 2000, the last day a country could sign the
Rome Statute without at the same time depositing an instrument of ratification, President Clinton signed the
Statute. In addition, he believed that "a properly constituted and structured ICC would make a profound
contribution in deterring egregious human rights abuses worldwide.").
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See generally Issues Update: U.S. Has No Legal Obligation to the International Criminal Court,
CITIZENS FOR GLOBAL SOLUTIONS, May 6, 2002 at http://globalsolutions.org/programs/lawjustice/icc/
resources/prosper unsigning.html (explaining that President Bush decided not to become a party to the ICC
because he believed that the document "was flawed in many regards").
32. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature July 17, 1998, art. 5,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90, 92 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
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the territory of a party state.33 In this way, citizens from countries that have not
joined the Court might still be subject to trial before it, if they are accused of
committing any of the crimes mentioned above in a country that is a member of
the International Criminal Court.34 In light of this, given that that the United
States has not ratified the Rome Statute and thus is not a member state of the
International Criminal Court, the only time that American soldiers or personnel
can be prosecuted by the International Criminal Court without the consent of the
American government, is if the crime was committed in a state other then the
United States and the other state is a state party of the International Criminal
Court.35 Due to this expansive jurisdiction of the Court and given that United
States military forces and civilian personnel are active in peacekeeping and
humanitarian missions in almost 100 countries at any given time,36 the United
States fears that International Criminal Court member states will use the Inter-
national Criminal Court to pursue politically motivated war crimes prosecutions
against American soldiers and personnel abroad.37  Ambassador John
Negroponte clearly articulated this concern in a United Nations Security
Council Press Release, when he stated "[w]e cannot accept a structure that may
transform the political criticism of America's world role into the basis for
criminal trials of Americans who have put their lives on the line for freedom."38
The international community, however, believes that United States fears
are greatly exaggerated, given that the Rome Statute contains numerous safe-
guards, which limit the possibility of the International Criminal Court pursuing
cases for political rather then legal motives against United States troops. 39 One
of the safeguards that the Rome Statute provides in order to preclude politically
motivated prosecutions, is that the crimes that fall under the International
Criminal Court's jurisdiction have been meticulously defined to exclude random
33. Anthony Dworkin, Introduction to The International Criminal Court: An End to Impunity?,
CRIMES OF WAR PROJECT: THE MAGAZINE, Dec. 2003, http://crimesofwar.org/icc magazine/icc-intro.html.
34. Id.
35. Johan D. Van der Vyver, Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, Case Western
Reserve School of Law, Frederick K. Cox Int'l Law Center War Crimes Research Portal, (Sept. 23, 2003),
at http:/law.case.edu/War-Crimes-Research-Portal/instant_analysis.asp?id=5.
36. Press Release, U.S. State Department, Under Secretary Calls It "Clearly Inconsistent With
American Standards" (Nov. 4, 2003), 2003 WL 64738615 (quoting John R. Bolton, Under Secretary of State
for Arms Control and International Security, Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute (Nov. 3, 2004)).
37. Warren Hoge, U.S. Drops Plan to Exempt GI. 'sfrom U.N. Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2004,
at Al.
38. Press Release, United States Mission to the United Nations, Explanation of Vote and Remarks
by Ambassador John D. Negroponte, United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations,
Following the Vote on UN Security Council Resolution 1422 on the International Criminal Court at the
Security Council Stake-Out, July 12,2002 (July 12, 2002), http://www.un.int/usa/02print_098.htm (last visited
Sept. 25, 2004).
39. See Dworkin, supra note 33.
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and isolated acts that a peacekeeper might conceivably commit. 4° For example,
according to Article five of the Rome Statute, the jurisdiction of the Inter-
national Criminal Court is limited only "to the most serious crimes of concern
to the international community as a whole," which include genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity.4' The Statute further prevents the Inter-
national Criminal Court from pursuing politically motivated crimes by
restricting its jurisdiction to cover only acts that have been committed as part of
a "widespread or systematic attack" (crimes against humanity), or crimes that
have been committed "as a part of a plan or policy" (war crimes).42
The most important safeguard provided by the Statute is that the Inter-
national Criminal Court was created as a "complementary court system," which
means that its jurisdiction will not take precedence over a competent national
court.4 3 In other words, the Statute allows the International Criminal Court to
begin investigation and prosecution only "where a state that has jurisdiction
over the case shows itself unwilling or unable to genuinely carry out the
prosecution." Thus, under Article Seventeen, the International Criminal Court
cannot take a case if a state is already investigating or prosecuting it or if a state
has investigated and then decided not to prosecute. 45 This principle, essentially,
makes the International Criminal Court a court of last resort.46
Despite these numerous safeguards, the United States still insists that it is
inappropriate to subject United States troops participating in United Nations
peacekeeping operations to the International Criminal Court, which cannot
provide adequate guarantees of due process.47 The United States further asserts
that United States courts and not the International Criminal Court should be
responsible for investigating and prosecuting its own citizens for committing
war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide.48 Only this way will citizens
be afforded constitutional guarantees of due process. 49 As a result of these
concerns, the United States has launched an aggressive campaign to exempt its
troops from prosecution by the International Criminal Court.50
40. U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4568th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4568 (2002).
41. Rome Statute, supra note 32, 2187 U.N.T.S. at 92.
42. Id.
43. Alex lonides, Above the Law?, EGYPT TODAY, Sept. 11, 2003, 2003 WL 60480647.
44. Dworkin, supra note 33.
45. The ICC is Unlikely to Try U.S. Soldiers, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/intemationaljustice/icc/us-role/us role 03.htm (lastvisited Sept. 25,2004).
46. Dworkin, supra note 33.
47. Ambassador James B. Cunningham, Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations,
Statement at the Security Council Stakeout (June 23, 2004), http://www.un.int/usa/04_1 1.htm.
48. U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4568th mtg., supra note 40, at 9.
49. Hoge, supra note 37.
50. See U.S. POLICYON THE ICC, supra note 2 (explaining that not only has the United States sought
exemption for its troops from the ICC by introducing Resolution 1422 and 1487 to the Security Council, but
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III. UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO EXEMPT ITS TROOPS
FROM ICC JURISDICTION
On July 12, 2002, just eleven days after the International Criminal Court
came into being, the United Nations Security Council adopted the first resolu-
tion, Resolution 1422, which provided troops and personnel from non-Inter-
national Criminal Court member states participating in United Nations
authorized missions, with one year exemption from the International Criminal
Court.51 The Resolution was adopted only after the United States/ United
Nations Ambassador, John Negroponte vetoed the extension of the Bosnian
peacekeeping mission,52 and other Bush Administration officials further
threatened to veto the renewal of all peacekeeping operations in the future, if
Council members did not adopt Resolution 1422.13 Eager to preserve peace-
keeping operations, the Security Council members had little choice, but to adopt
Resolution 1422 despite its serious flaws and despite the aggressive opposition
voiced by numerous countries during the Security Council meeting, just two
days before the adoption of the Resolution.54
At the July 10th meeting at the United Nations Security Council,
Ambassador Negroponte expressed on behalf of the United States, that the
United States veto of the resolution on the United Nations Mission in Bosnia
and Herzegovina did not in any way reflect its rejection of peacekeeping in
Bosnia.55 The veto did reflect, however, the United States frustration over its
inability to persuade Security Council members to seriously consider United
States concerns with regards to the legal exposure that United States peace-
keepers have under the Rome Statute.56 The United States further conveyed,
that while peacekeepers do act in a lawful manner, they still find themselves in
difficult and ambiguous situations.57 As a result, the United States stressed that
peacekeepers from states that are not parties to the Rome Statute should not face
additional unnecessary legal jeopardy, in addition to the hardships of deploy-
ment that they already face.58
it has also pursued bilateral agreements with countries around the world to prevent the surrender of U.S.
nationals to the ICC).
51. Id.
52. The ICC and Security Council: Res. 1422 Legal and Policy Analysis, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
(May 2003), http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/icc/crisis/0609hrwreport.htm [hereinafter Policy
Analysis].
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4568th mtg., supra note 40, at 9.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 10.
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The countries that participated in the Security Council meeting did not,
however, agree with United States justifications for seeking a one year exemp-
tion for its troops.59 Instead, they saw United States insistence on receiving
immunity for its troops as an attempt by the United States to place its troops and
personnel above international law.6" As Mr. Heinbecker, the Canadian
representative who participated in the debate, put it: "[a]t stake today are ...
issues that raise questions about whether all people are equal and accountable
before the law...."61 At the end of his speech Mr. Heinbecker called for an end
to impunity from prosecution for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes.62 Mr. MacKay from New Zealand, who also participated in the debate,
similarly saw no need for exemptions of peacekeepers from the jurisdiction of
the Court.63 Instead, he argued that the exemptions placed peacekeepers above
the law, in addition to placing the moral authority of the peacekeepers and the
United Nations in serious jeopardy. 64
All together, across the board, countries generally argued that Resolution
1422 was unnecessary, given the numerous safeguards imbedded within the
Statute, that it was outside the scope of the Security Council's authority, and
that it was inconsistent with the Rome Statute. 65 Even leading Non-Govern-
mental Organizations (NGOs) expressed similar views.66 In fact, Amnesty
International's eighty two page legal memorandum analyzing Resolution 1422,
is by far the most complete and thorough compilation of arguments expressed
against this Resolution.67 It stressed two main points already shared by the
international community.
First, Amnesty International stressed that Resolution 1422 is contrary to
the Rome Statute. 68 Resolution 1422 in part reads as follows:
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 1.
Requests, consistent with the provisions of Article 16 of the Rome
Statute, that the International Criminal Court, if a case arises
involving current or former officials or personnel from a contributing
59. See id.
60. See U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4568th mtg., supra note 40.
61. Id. at 3.
62. Id. at 4.
63. Id. at 5.
64. Id.
65. U.S. POLICY ON THE ICC, supra note 2.
66. See Policy Analysis, supra note 52; See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: THE UNLAWFUL ATTEMPT BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO GIVE US CITIZENS PERMANENT IMPUNITY
FROM INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE (May 2003), http://www.iccnow.org/documents/declrationsresolutions/
UN 1422_2003.html [hereinafter PERMANENT IMPUNITY].
67. See id
68. Id. at 36.
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State not a Party to the Rome Statue over acts or omissions relating
to a United Nations established or authorized operation, shall for a
twelve-month period starting 1 July 2002 not commence or proceed
with investigation or prosecution of any such case, unless the Security
Council decides otherwise .... 69
Article sixteen of the Rome Statute, which the Resolution speaks of, allows
the Security Council to request the International Criminal Court, pursuant to
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and in the interest of peace and
security, to postpone an investigation or a prosecution for twelve months.70 The
drafting history of Article sixteen reveals that the Article was only intended to
be used in rare cases, such as when the Security Council considers that the peace
negotiations which it is overseeing with a government leader, would be impeded
by an investigation or prosecution.7'
Resolution 1422, however, sought to invoke Article sixteen contrary to the
drafter's intent. Article sixteen requires the Security Council to request the
International Criminal Court to grant a temporary deferral of investigation or
prosecution of a case, on a case by case basis." With each case the Security
Council has to determine, whether the deferral would be necessary to help it
maintain international peace and security.73 Resolution 1422, on the other hand,
was not adopted after an ad hoc determination. 74 Instead, the Resolution pro-
vided a general exception for a whole class of people before any case had arisen,
and the Security Council had not determined whether special circumstances
existed to make the deferral necessary to maintain peace and security.7 5 In
addition, the fact that the United States included in Resolution 1422 its intention
to "renew the request... under the same conditions each July for further 12-
month periods for as long as maybe necessary," makes this Resolution further
contrary to Article sixteen. 6 Article sixteen includes a specific twelve month
deferral, after which time the Security Council can renew the request under the
same conditions.77 However, considerations of any proposal for renewal have
69. U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4572nd mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1422 (2002).
70. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: SECURITY COUNCIL MUST
REFUSE TO RENEW UNLAWFUL RESOLUTION 1422 (May 2003),
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/otherissues/1422/Amnesty1 422SumMay2003Eng.pdf [hereinafter
REFUSAL TO RENEW].
71. PERMANENT IMPUNITY, supra note 66, at 42-43.
72. REFUSAL TO RENEW, supra note 70, at 4.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. REFUSAL TO RENEW, supra note 70, at 4.
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to be made on a case by case basis at the time the resolution is to be renewed.78
In light of the aforementioned facts, Amnesty International stressed that the
Security Council's intention to renew Resolution 1422 automatically, as
expressed in the Resolution, illustrates the Council's complete disregard for the
true purpose of Article sixteen and its intentions to provide perpetual impunity
to officials and personnel of non-International Criminal Court member states
from International Criminal Court's jurisdiction.79
The second point that Amnesty International stressed, also shared by the
international community, is that Resolution 1422 is contrary to the United
Nations Charter (UNC).8° The Security Council, which is a political organ of
the United Nations established pursuant to international law, can only exercise
those powers contained under the United Nations Charter.8" Like any other
political organization established under law, it cannot act beyond its own
powers.82 However, by adopting Resolution 1422, the Security Council
exceeded its powers set out in the United Nations Charter.83
In Resolution 1422, the Security Council purported to act under Chapter
VII of the United Nations Charter.84 Chapter VII gives the Security Council
specific powers that it can use to take action with respect to threats to the peace,
breaches of peace, and acts of aggression.85 However, the Security Council
cannot act under this Chapter unless it first complies with certain procedural
requirements of the United Nations Charter, by making the specific determina-
tions that Article thirty nine requires.86 Article thirty nine of the United Nations
Charter expressly provides that, "[t]he Security Council shall determine the
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggres-
sion.... ,87 Thus, any action, which the Security Council takes under Chapter
VII, must be based upon a determination of the existence of a threat, breach of
peace, or an act of aggression.88 The drafting history of Resolution 1422 illu-
strates, however, that for the first time in fifty seven years,89 the Security
Council failed to make such determination before acting under Chapter VH1. 90
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See PERMANENT IMPUNITY, supra note 66, at 51.
81. REFUSAL TO RENEW, supra note 70, at 5.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. PERMANENT IMPUNITY, supra note 66, at 59.
87. Id. at 60.
88. Id.
89. REFUSAL TO RENEW, supra note 70, at 6.
90. PERMANENT IMPUNITY, supra note 66, at 60.
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The third major point stressed by the international community in
opposition of Resolution 1422 is best articulated by another NGO, the Human
Rights Watch. 9' Resolution 1422 exempted officials and personnel from non-
International Criminal Court member states participating in United Nations
peacekeeping missions from the International Criminal Court.92 However,
Human Rights Watch stressed that this Resolution is in clear violation of Article
twenty seven of the Rome Statute.93 Article twenty seven of the Rome Statute
which reads in part, "[t]his Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any
distinction based on official capacity ... ,,9' expressly prohibits any state or
international organization from making distinctions on the basis of official
capacity. 95 This provision, contained in the Rome Statute, was a crucial one
because it encompassed the fundamental purpose of the Statute, to ensure that
no person is placed above the law, including politicians, heads of state, and
United Nations peacekeepers.96 Contrary to this provision, Resolution 1422
exempted an entire class of individuals from prosecution by the International
Criminal Court and thus opened the door to impunity in cases where national
courts of non-International Criminal Court member states fail to carry out good
faith prosecutions of its own troops and personnel.97
Despite the visible opposition voiced by NGOs and countries around the
world against Resolution 1422, the exemption for United States troops and
personnel from International Criminal Court's jurisdiction was renewed for a
second year in a row on June 12, 2003.98 The second time around, however,
Security Council members, France, Germany, and Syria, abstained from the
vote.99 Kofi Annan, along with more then seventy countries, also expressed
their strong disapproval for Resolution 1487 during an open meeting at the
Security Council.'
In his opening speech, Kofi Annan conveyed the reasons why the Security
Council was compelled to renew the Resolution in spite of the strong opposi-
tion.' Although he felt that the request to renew Resolution 1422 was
unnecessary, due to the numerous safeguards provided by the Rome Statute, he
nevertheless understood that the Council members felt it necessary to renew the
91. See Policy Analysis, supra note 52.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Rome Statute, supra note 32, 2187 U.N.T.S. at 106.
95. Policy Analysis, supra note 52.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See U.S. POLICY ON THE ICC, supra note 2.
99. Id.
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Resolution for another year, given that the "Court [was] still in its infancy and
no case [had] yet been brought before it.' 1 2 The main concern that Kofi Annan
and the other countries expressed at the debate, was over United States insis-
tence that the Security Council renew the Resolution as a "technical roll-
over."1 °3 Kofi Annan along with the other countries, have expressed the oppo-
site view, that this Resolution was never intended to be renewed indefinitely as
a technical roll-over.'04 As Kofi Annan pointed out, "allow me to express the
hope that this does not become an annual routine. If it did, I fear the world
would interpret it as meaning that the Council wished to claim absolute and
permanent immunity for people serving in the operations it establishes or
authorizes."'0' 5 Other countries expressed similar sentiments.1
0 6
The United States attempts to exempt its troops and personnel from the
International Criminal Court's jurisdiction did not stop, however, with the
adoption and renewal of Resolution 1422.107 The United States government
representatives have been seeking Bilateral Immunity Agreements (BIAs) with
countries around the world to shield its citizens from prosecution by the
International Criminal Court.'08 These bilateral agreements provide that neither
country that is party to the agreement would transfer the other's government
officials, military and other personnel to the International Criminal Court's
jurisdiction.'0 9 Contrary to the assurance provided by high-level United States
officials that the United States would respect the rights of those countries that
support the International Criminal Court; the Bush Administration has used
coercive tactics to secure bilateral agreements with these countries."'0 The most
coercive of these tactics involves the American Servicemembers' Protection Act
(ASPA), which was signed into law by President Bush on August 2, 2002, and
102. Id.
103. Fact vs. Fiction: Security Council Members Never Intended Renewal to Become Automatic,
CITIZENS FOR GLOBAL SOLUTION (June 22, 2004), at http://www.globalsolutions.org/programs/law_
justice/icc/unsc/2004/bouchervs reality.html [hereinafter Fact vs. Fiction].
104. Id.
105. U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4772nd mtg., supra note 100, at 3.
106. See Fact vs. Fiction, supra note 103 (explaining that Sir Jeremy Greenstock from Great Britain
also expressed that, "[w]e regard Security Council Resolution 1422 (2002) as an exceptional measure. It is
not permanent; nor is it automatically renewable."). See also U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4772nd mtg., supra note
100, at 24 (explaining that Mr. Duclos, the French representative that abstained from the vote, also expressed
the following: "Paragraph 2 of Resolution 1422 (2002) did not contain a commitment to automatic
renewal... Such a renewal risks lending credence to the perception that such exemptions are permanent. That
appearance of permanency can only weaken the Court and harm its authority.").
107. See COALITION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, U.S. BILATERAL IMMUNITY OR SO-
CALLED "ARTICLE 98" AGREEMENTS (2003), http://www.iccnow.org/pressroom/factsheets/FS-
BIAsSept2003.pdf [hereinafter U.S. BILATERAL IMMUNITY].
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which allows him to cut off United States military assistance to International
Criminal Court member states that have not signed the Bilateral Immunity
Agreement's."'
This coercive law allows the Administration to pick and choose, which
countries should continue receiving United States military aid in spite of not
signing the Bilateral Immunity Agreement's with the United States. 12 Broad
waivers and exemptions included within the Act allow the President to continue
providing aid to countries that choose not to conclude these agreements and
which the President deems important for United States national security. 13 In
accordance with ASPA, major United States allies including the nineteen
members of NATO and other major non-NATO allies have been exempted from
it. 114 On July 1, 2003, the deadline set out in the ASPA for the cut off of United
States military assistance to International Criminal Court member states that had
not signed the Bilateral Immunity Agreement's, President Bush granted waivers
to twenty two International Criminal Court member states that receive United
States military aid and which had not signed agreements." 5 Since then, he has
issued additional waivers, covering a total of thirty two countries 1 6 According
to the most current figures, as of May 28, 2004, eighty nine countries had signed
a Bilateral Immunity Agreement with the United States." 7 Of the International
Criminal Court member states, fifty eight out of the ninety four currently
existing member states refused to sign a Bilateral Immunity Agreement's with
the United States, leaving only thirty six International Criminal Court member
states which had signed these agreements with the United States under the threat
of loosing military aid." 8 Out of those International Criminal Court member
states that have refused to sign Bilateral Immunity Agreement's, over twenty
states to this day have been left without any military assistance from the United
States. "9
In addition to aggressively pursuing Bilateral Immunity Agreement's with
other countries, the United States requested the Security Council to renew
Resolution 1487 in May of this year for a third year in a row.' This year,
however, the circumstances were different than in the previous two years. This
111. U.S. POLICY ON THE ICC, supra note 2.
112. See WASHINGTON WORKING GROUP ON THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, U.S. IMPUNITY
AGREEMENTS: A SUMMARY, at http://www.wfa.org/issues/wicc/article98/article98home.html (last visited July
1,2004).
113. Id.
114. U.S. BILATERAL IMMUNITY, supra note 107.
115. U.S. IMPUNITY AGREEMENTS: A SUMMARY, supra note 112.
116. Id.
117. STATUS OF THE ICC AND U.S. POLICY, JANUARY-MAY 2004, supra note 24.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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year the United States was requesting from the Security Council an exemption
for troops of non-International Criminal Court member states, at a time when
the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal took a prominent place on the front page
covers of newspapers around the world. 2' The question that has remained
unanswered then, is whether the United States was justified this year in seeking
an exemption for its troops from prosecution by the International Criminal
Court, given that its own troops committed grievous war crimes against Iraqi
prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison?
IV. WAS THE UNITED STATES JUSTIFIED IN SEEKING THE EXEMPTION FOR ITS
TROOPS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT THIS YEAR?
The United States has always been an active advocate of international
justice.'22 Not only did it help establish the Nuremberg tribunals and the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, but it also
became a key signatory to numerous international humanitarian treaties, such
as the Geneva Convention.123 However, despite being at the forefront of inter-
national justice and despite its role as the world's policeman and as a major
contributor to United Nations peacekeeping missions around the world, the
United States demonstrated this year that it too is capable of committing heinous
war crimes, as the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal illustrated.'24
On April 28, 2004, the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse became public when the
first images depicting Iraqi prisoners at the Abu Ghraib being subjected to a
variety of abuses by United States soldiers, were broadcast on "60 Minutes
II., ' 125 Following this broadcast, other photographs depicting Iraqi prisoner
abuses became public.126 These photographs speak for themselves. One photo-
graph shows that an Iraqi prisoner is naked. 127 His hands are clasped behind his
neck and he is leaning against the cell door with great fear, as the dogs bark at
him a few feet away. 128 Another photograph depicts an Iraqi prisoner who is
121. See US. Tries to Get Off the Hook On War Crimes, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, May 20, 2004,
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/05/20/usint8602_txt.htm.
122. President Bill Clinton, Statement on Signature of the Rome Treaty of the International Criminal
Court (Dec. 31, 2000), in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: WILLIAM J. CLINTON,
2000-2001 2816-17 (2002).
123. Id.
124. See CITIZENS FOR GLOBAL SOLUTIONS, U.S. ABUSE OF PRISONERS AND THE NEED FOR
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2004), htpp://www.globalsolutions.org/programs/lawjustice/news/iraqi
prisoners.html.
125. Seymour M. Hersh, Chain of Command, NEW YORKER, May 17, 2004 [hereinafter Chain of
Command].
126. See id.
127. Id.
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lying on the ground in great pain, with a soldier sitting on top of him, with his
knees pressed to his back and blood is streaming from this prisoner's leg.'29 In
yet another photograph, a naked prisoner from his waist to his ankles is
captured, lying on the floor, with a bite on his right thigh. 3 There is another
larger wound on his left leg, covered with blood. 3 '
These abuses were not uncommon, however, during Saddam Hussein's era.
During his regime, the Abu Ghraib prison was one of the world's most
notorious prisons for the weekly executions and the vile living conditions. 32
Torture was also a common practice at the Abu Ghraib, which included isola-
tion, beatings, rapes, attack dogs, electric shocks, and starvation. 33 Following
the collapse of Saddam's regime, the United States turned the Abu Ghraib into
a military prison. 134 Unlike in Saddam's times, most of the prisoners captured
by United States troops were civilians, including women and teenagers, many
of whom had been picked up randomly during the military sweeps and at
highway checkpoints. 35 The other prisoners fell into three distinct categories:
1) common criminals, 2) security detainees suspected of "crimes against the
coalition", and 3) a small number of suspected "high-value" leaders of the
insurgency against the coalition forces. 36 What stunned the world as the images
of United States soldiers torturing Iraqi prisoners flooded newspapers and T.V.
news, was the United States was committing the same crimes it went to war
with Iraq to prevent. 37 Instead of ending the prisoner abuses and human rights
violations prevalent during Saddam's regime, the United States was contributing
to the abuses.'38
Before the pictures were released to the media, however, on January 31,
2004, Commander, Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC)
Lieutenant General David McKiernan, appointed Major General (MG) Antonio
Taguba to conduct an investigation under Article fifteen-six into the 800th
Military Police Brigade's detention and internment operations. 139 This investi-
gation came about as a result of the criminal investigation initiated by the
United States Army Criminal Investigation Command of the specific allegations
of detainee abuse committed by members of the 372nd Military Police
129. Id.
130. Chain of Command, supra note 125.
131. Id.
132. Seymour M. Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, NEW YORKER May 10, 2004.
133. Remnick, David, Hearts and Minds, NEW YORKER, May 10, 2004.
134. Hersh, supra note 132.
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Company, 320th Military Police Battalion in Iraq, all which are part of the
800th Military Police Brigade. 40 MG Taguba was specifically asked to inquire
into all the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegations of detainee
abuse, especially over the allegations of the mistreatment of the Abut Ghraib
prisoners.141
Following his investigation, on February 26th, MG Taguba submitted his
report. 42 His report concluded that between October and December of 2003,
at the Abu Ghraib prison, numerous incidents of sadistic, blatant and wanton
criminal abuses were inflicted on several detainees. 143 He further concluded that
the systemic and illegal abuse of the detainees was intentionally perpetrated by
several members of the 372nd Military Police Company, 320th Military Police
Battalion, 800th Military Police Brigade. 44 The intentional abuse of detainees
by military police personnel included the following acts: "a) punching, slapping
and kicking detainees ... b) videotaping and photographing naked male and
female detainees, c) forcibly arranging detainees in various sexually explicit
positions for photographing ... f) forcing groups of male detainees to mastur-
bate themselves while being photographed and videotaped ... k) a male MP
guard having sex with a female detainee....,,145 These allegations were substan-
tiated by detailed witness statements and the discovered graphic photographs.14 6
Several detainees also described the following acts of abuse performed on them:
"a) breaking chemical lights and pouring the phosphoric liquid on detainees ...
d) beating detainees with a broom handle and chair, e) threatening male
detainees with rape ... h) using military working dogs to frighten and intimidate
detainees with threats of attack.'
147
After learning about these abuses, the international community heavily
criticized the United States for having violated multiple international treaties,
which the United States had ratified and upheld in the past.'48 For instance, the
United States currently stands in violation of both the Third and the Fourth
Geneva Conventions of 1949.149 In time of war, every person in enemy hands
must have some kind of status under international law. 50 If the person caught
in enemy hands is a prisoner of war, then that person will protected by the Third
140. Id. at 6.
141. Id.
142. Chain of Command, supra note 125.
143. Investigation Report, supra note 139, at 16.
144. Id.
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Geneva Convention.151 If, on the other hand, that person is a civilian, then he
will be protected by the Fourth Geneva Convention. 152 In this case, because
United States soldiers tortured both prisoners of war and civilians at Abu Ghraib
prison, they violated both Article thirteen of the Third Geneva Convention of
1949, 153 and Article twenty seven of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949.154
The United States also violated Article seven of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights of 1966,15' and Article two of the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of
1984. 156
The inhumane treatment and the torture performed on Iraqi prisoners by
United States soldiers, is not only a grave breach of these international treaties,
but it is also considered a war crime under the International Criminal Court.'57
The International Criminal Court is based in part on the Geneva Conventions,
therefore some of the protections extended to prisoners of war and civilians
under the Conventions are also included under the definition of war crimes in
the Rome Statute.'58 Under Article eight, war crimes mean:
a) grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
namely any of the following acts against persons ... under the provi-
sions of the relevant Geneva Convention ... ii) torture or inhuman
treatment ... iii) willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to
body or health ... b) xxi) committing outrages upon personal dignity,
in particular humiliating and degrading treatment .... 159
151. Id.
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U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]. ("Prisoners of war must at all times
be humanely treated.... Likewise, prisoners of war must at all times be protected, particularly against acts
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154. Geneva Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art.
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If any one of these war crimes enumerated by the Rome Statute and
committed by United States soldiers is broken down into its elements, one will
find that every element of the crime has been met by the actions of United States
soldiers, thereby making them guilty of war crimes. 160 For instance, looking
closely to the war crime committed upon personal dignity under Article eight
(two)(b)(xxi), the elements of the crime are:
1. The perpetrator humiliated, degraded or otherwise violated the
dignity of one or more persons. 2. The severity of the humiliation,
degradation or other violation was of such degree as to be generally
recognized as an outrage upon personal dignity. 3. The conduct took
place in the context of and was associated with an international armed
conflict. 4. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that
established the existence of an armed conflict. 161
As to the first two elements, both the graphic photographs and the Taguba
Report have confirmed, not only that United States soldiers did violate the
dignity of Iraqi prisoners by using torture and inhumane ways of extracting
information from them, but that these actions do rise to a level that could be
considered an outrage upon personal dignity. As to the last two elements, the
conduct of United States soldiers did take place in the context of and was
associated with an international armed conflict, the War in Iraq. Furthermore,
the perpetrators, in the case United States soldiers, were aware of the factual
circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict, given that
they were fully aware that they had gone to Iraq to put an end to Saddam's
terror and human rights abuses. As a result, the International Criminal Court
currently does not have any jurisdiction over the actions of United States troops
in Iraq and cannot prosecute them.162 Therefore, the aforementioned evidence
clearly shows that United States troops are, nevertheless, guilty of committing
war crimes in violation of Article eight of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court.
Given that the United States breached international treaties and is guilty of
war crimes under the Rome Statute for torturing the Abu Ghraib prisoners, was
the United States justified this year in requesting impunity for its troops serving
on United Nations missions from prosecution by the International Criminal
Court? The answer to that question is of course, no. With this incident, the
United States has demonstrated that even its own troops are capable of com-
mitting heinous war crimes. The United States insists, however, that because
it is not a signatory to the Rome Statute, The United States courts instead of the
160. See U.N. GAOR, 10th Sess., Annex 1, addendum pt. 2, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2.
161. Id. at 33.
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International Criminal Court should prosecute its own troops guilty of
committing war crimes in another country.16 3 The United States objects to its
troops being prosecuted by the International Criminal Court not because it
refuses to bring to justice its own citizens, who have committed war crimes in
other countries, but because the Court does not provide adequate guarantees of
due process, which United States courts do provide. 64 In fact, the United States
maintains that the international community has nothing to fear because United
States citizens guilty of committing egregious war crimes will not go unpunish-
ed, especially since the United States already has a well-functioning system for
military justice that does ensure accountability. 65 The United States Constitu-
tion, for instance, gives Congress the power to order court-martials for war
crimes committed by United States troops. 166 The Uniform Code of Military
Justice, gives general court-martials jurisdiction over any person who by the law
of war is subject to trial by a military tribunal, including for crimes under inter-
national law. 167 Lastly, the War Crimes Act of 1996 gives United States courts
authority to try either troops or civilians for violations of the laws of war.1
68
If granting United States troops impunity from prosecution by the Inter-
national Criminal Court means not that they will escape criminal liability, but
that they will be prosecuted by United States courts with adequate guarantees
of due process, which the United States Constitution affords them, then has the
United States punished those responsible for the prisoner abuses? It has been
recently reported that seven American soldiers have been already charged.
169
The first soldier to face court martial proceedings went on trial in Iraq on May
19.0 But seeing that these charges were brought only against lower-level
soldiers, the Human Rights Watch has publicly criticized the United States for
not investigating the superiors of these soldiers to see whether they ordered or
knowingly tolerated these abuses.' In fact, recent press reports have
uncovered that the torture the United States soldiers submitted Iraqi prisoners
to at Abu Ghraib, was not an isolated act of a few deviant soldiers.'72 On the
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contrary, interviews and government documents have brought to light, that true
responsibility for the torture at Abu Ghraib lies not within a few Army
reservists, but within the very highest levels of the Bush Administration. 1
73
It has been revealed and verified by numerous sources, that Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, assisted by his Undersecretary for Intelligence,
Stephen Cambone, set up a secret program in 2001 called Special Access
Program (SAP) to assassinate targeted individuals in the Bush Administration's
war on terror.174 This program was subsequently brought to Iraq in the summer
and fall of 2003 to remedy the growing insurgency United States forces faced
in Iraq. 175 The solution to stopping this growing insurgency, which Rumsfeld
endorsed and Combone carried out, was to get tough with the Iraqis in the Army
prisons who were suspected of being insurgents.'76 This entailed turning United
States prisons in Iraq into torture camps to extract information from the
prisoners about the resistance." 7 To achieve this, Cambone removed the
military intelligence officers carrying out the interrogations from the authority
of the normal military chain of command, and incorporated them into the
Special Access Program.'78 Rumsfeld and Cambone even went a step further
and expanded the scope of Special Access Program, by bringing unconventional
methods to Abu Ghraib, such as exposing the prisoners to sexual humiliation. 1
79
These operations did not go unnoticed, however, by both Condoleezza Rice, the
national-security advisor who approved the operations, and President Bush who
was informed of the existence of the programs.'
If United States courts fail to prosecute the top officials for the prisoner
abuse committed at Abu Ghraib, then these war crimes would go unpunished
here in the United States. The International Criminal Court, which normally
ensures accountability when national courts either fail or refuse to punish its
own nationals, would not be able to step in and prosecute these officials, given
that the International Criminal Court currently has no jurisdiction over United
States actions in Iraq. As a result, these heinous crimes committed at Abu
Ghraib will go unpunished. But what if United States soldiers and top officials
had committed war crimes in one of the fifty eight International Criminal Court
member states that did not sign Bilateral Immunity Agreements with the United
States, and which are member states of the International Criminal Court? In
such a case, even if United States courts failed to prosecute its own troops and
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officials in order to protect them, the International Criminal Court would,
nevertheless, have jurisdiction to prosecute them in its tribunal. The Inter-
national Criminal Court in that case would ensure accountability for the
grievous war crimes committed by United States soldiers and officials. The
Resolution sought this year by the United States, however, would have
exempted those responsible for committing war crimes in International Criminal
Court member states from prosecution by the International Criminal Court, for
a period of one year. This means that, if in the future United States courts
decide not to prosecute its own troops and officials, once again the heinous war
crimes would go unpunished by both national United States courts and the
International Criminal Court. Given that United States troops are capable of
committing war crimes in any part of the world, the United States was not
justified in protecting its troops from the rule of law by seeking exemptions for
their actions from the International Criminal Court.
United States insistence this year on an exemption for its troops and
personnel from the International Criminal Court, in light of the prisoner abuses,
sent a powerful message throughout the world, that the United States is placing
itself above international law and does not have to abide by it. This is not a
good message for the United States to advocate if it wants to maintain the
support of the international community in the future. At the moment, the
ramifications of United States policy and practice in Iraq, in light of the prisoner
abuse scandal, have already been severe. Not only did the United States loose
credibility in Iraq, the very same country it was trying to rebuild, but it also hurt
America's prospects in the war on terror. 81 The United States further under-
mined its ability to demand humane treatment for its soldiers and civilians in the
hands of its enemies. 8 2 Given that the United States has already secured a bad
name for itself due to prisoner abuse, it does not need to alienate itself further
from the international community by attempting to place itself above the rule
of law. Doing so would further impair United States credibility.
V. CONCLUSION
The United States started out by demanding the Security Council to renew
Resolution 1487, which it was not justified to do. In the end, however, it did the
right thing by withdrawing the Resolution from the United Nations floor. Its
reasons for doing so are questionable. However, actions speak louder than
words, and for now the withdrawal of the Resolution could be the sign the
international community needs from the United States, to assure it that the
United States will not seek special treatment from international law any time
soon.
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